| 引用本文: | 黄振高.具有可数个局中人的连续凸对策.[J].国防科技大学学报,1987,(1):81-90.[点击复制] |
| Huang Zhengao.Continuous Convex Games with Countably Many Players[J].Journal of National University of Defense Technology,1987,(1):81-90[点击复制] |
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| 具有可数个局中人的连续凸对策 |
| 黄振高 |
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| 摘要: |
| 在合作对策的理论中，关于各种解的概念的研究向来是引人注目的课题。本文旨在研究一类特殊的合作对策即具有可数个局中人的连续凸对策的各种解。所得结果也可看成是具有有限个局中人的凸对策之相应结果的推广。 |
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| 投稿日期：1986-05-30 |
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| Continuous Convex Games with Countably Many Players |
| Huang Zhengao |
| Abstract: |
| The purpose of this paper is investigating various solutions of continuous convex games with contably many players. We showed that for such games,the core is the unique stable set and coincides with the bargaininng set (for the grand coalition)，and the kernel (for the grand coalition)is a nonempty subset of the core. These can be viewed as a generalization of similar results obtained by Shapley，Maschler and Peleg. The values of the games are also considered and it is proved that the Banach space acM，introduced by Artstein，is the closed linear subspace generated by all these games. Moreover，the value of every such game is in the core，as is the case for finite convex games. |
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